

authorization to co-determine which norms are appropriate and how they are to be implemented (pp. 147, 150-151). In Hegel's marriage case, for instance, the relationship between the parties can perhaps be understood in terms of the 'reciprocal granting of a claim to co-determination' (p. 172). But the woman in fact authorizes or accepts the oppressive norm that puts her in a position of structural disadvantage. We might say that this is false consciousness, but then we need a theory of real interests, something that in turn presupposes norms whose validity does not depend on their being co-determined by the parties to whose interactions they apply.

There is something profoundly inspiring about the conception of recognition Honneth uncovers in the tradition of German Idealism. But its adequate articulation requires a better account of the relational norms that govern our interactions with each other. These are the moral norms that determine what we owe to each other, specifying the claims to consideration or regard whose acknowledgement is ultimately constitutive of genuine recognition (Wallace forthcoming).

Reference

Wallace, R. Jay forthcoming, 'Recognition and the Moral Nexus', *European Journal of Philosophy*

University of California, Berkeley, USA
doi: 10.1093/mind/fzab058

R. JAY WALLACE

Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy, edited by Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 248.

In his later works Nietzsche repeatedly underscores the importance of philosophical methods. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, for example, he takes issue with the 'awkward and very improper methods' of previous philosophers (BGE P). Further, in *The Anti-Christ* he makes plain that 'the most valuable insights are the last to be discovered; but methods are the most valuable insights' (A 13), and, finally, in underscoring their importance once again in that same text Nietzsche writes: 'the methods, it should be said times over, are the essential thing, as well as the most difficult thing' (A 59, emphasis in original). Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer's strong collection of thirteen essays by notable Nietzsche scholars takes seriously such claims. Indeed, instead of assuming that Nietzsche's prescriptive recommendations concerning what it means to be a philosopher, what philosophy should be, or how philosophy ought to be done, are of secondary importance—to be addressed, if at all, only *en route* to more standard philosophical issues—the volume affords Nietzsche's normative views on these matters pride of place. What is at stake,

however, is not simply a concern with framing. In fact, as we will see, what emerges is an even stronger claim: a failure properly to attend to Nietzsche's metaphilosophical positions leads to rather acute problems of interpretation. Loeb and Meyer deserve credit for amassing such a thought-provoking and valuable collection of high-quality work. It will serve, I think, just as they hope, to further 'advance the topic of metaphilosophy to the forefront of Nietzsche Studies' (p. 3).

The first of the volume's four parts, entitled 'Evolving Metaphilosophies', consists of a series of three papers, which argue that, for Nietzsche, we get a bit further in understanding what philosophy is by taking up the question: what is a philosopher? Each paper's answer is at root the same: the philosopher, according to Nietzsche, is the one with a transgressive, creative, value-legislative task (for example, pp. 16, 23, 31, 58). A central interpretive issue, predictably perhaps, then concerns specifying precisely how that undertaking 'evolves' in Nietzsche's view.

In the hands of Marco Brusotti, Nietzsche's metaphilosophy unfolds a 'genetic' answer to the question: 'how does one become a philosopher?' (p. 9). Nietzsche's response, Brusotti explains, is one that is historically situated and naturalistically bound, but one that becomes increasingly autobiographical. As it does, Brusotti claims, what we witness is the waning of 'a general metaphilosophical claim'—to circumscribe the function of the philosopher as, say, the 'lawgiver as to the measure, stamp, and weight of things' (*SE* 3)—to find waxing descriptions of 'Nietzsche's experience' (p. 21). Brusotti provocatively concludes that such a move, namely away from general definitions and descriptions to Nietzsche's 'own task', represents an 'implosion' of Nietzsche's metaphilosophy (p. 21). The personal, it seems, is not metaphilosophical. A point that I contest and one to which I return.

For Matthew Meyer, by contrast, we can read Nietzsche's ostensibly competing metaphilosophies—philosophy understood as a scientific and truth-seeking pursuit or philosophy as an artistic, life-affirming, legislative project (p. 23)—dialectically and hence as unified. Instead of seeing a major break or substantive revision in Nietzsche's views—from an understanding of philosophy as truth-seeking and methodologically unified, or at least continuous, with the natural sciences (*HH*) to a value-legislative enterprise (*BGE*)—Meyer argues that 'Nietzsche's free spirit works—*Human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims*, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, *Daybreak* and *The Gay Science*—are best understood as a consciously constructed dialectical *Bildungsroman*' (p. 23). He also argues that those free spirit works are driven by an internal tension motivated by a metaphilosophical issue: how are we to understand what the philosopher is? (p. 32). Accordingly, what emerges, according to Meyer, is a rather strikingly unified view, suggesting that for Nietzsche, from beginning to end, the philosopher is one 'who embraces both subjectivity and creativity and transforms the project of philosophy into a self-conscious autobiography' (p. 41). Meyer's solution to the tension

is at once tidy and intriguing. However, it is not clear that this is Nietzsche's view. The latter's view, to the contrary, is that the philosopher '[must] not have the slightest idea *what* [they] are' such that there remains something necessarily unconscious in their development and achievement of '*the task*' (*EH* 'Clever' 9, emphasis in original; cf. *BGE* 6).

Antoine Panaÿoti's contribution raises a pointed interpretive issue: insofar as the Analytical Nietzsche—'the dominant Nietzsche in contemporary English-language Nietzsche reception' (p. 42)—prizes truth (p. 61), seeks "'rationally defensible theories" on the basis of careful reasoned enquiry' (p. 61) and holds that 'philosophy . . . ought to follow the sciences' lead', it assumes, Panaÿoti argues, 'the appropriateness of precisely that conception of philosophy that Nietzsche contests' (p. 62). Nietzsche's view, according to Panaÿoti, is that philosophy is a mode of 'axiological legislation' that seeks to devalue the 'will to truth' and in its place offer a '(purportedly) life-promoting will-to-power doctrine' (p. 61). Hence Nietzsche's view of what philosophy ought to be is '*metaphilosophically discontinuous*' with the received, dominant, Analytical Nietzsche (p. 62, emphasis in original).

There is much to like about the provocative nature of Panaÿoti's piece. Indeed, its clarion call for interpreters to take Nietzsche seriously as a metaphilosopher is as loud as it is clear. Yet, arguably, of course, it is one thing to *be* a great philosopher and quite another to rigorously reconstruct or to otherwise coherently interpret the works of one based on textual and historical factors. If the so-called Analytical Nietzscheans claim to be up to no more than the latter, the core objection to their approach would appear to be if not moot, then markedly less persuasive.

However, leaving things here would fail to do justice, I think, to a deeper and more interesting issue and one which Panaÿoti's contribution, along with the others, asks us to consider: does Nietzsche's critique of the Christian-moral outlook, and its secular derivatives, amount to a personal task and, thereby, simply an expression of preferences? To reply in the affirmative, as is at times implied by the works of this section, is something of an over-simplification.

To see why, I will focus on one dimension of that critique, namely the Christian-moral outlook's propensity to overestimate the goodness of 'selflessness, self-sacrifice, or sympathy and pity' (*GS* 345). What Nietzsche reveals is that these apparently non-egoistic, other-centred, values conceal selfish motives (*D* 133, *GS* 21). At issue is not simply this self-conflicting stance—though, of course, one might object to that—but rather the fact that our moral values serve functions. For some, an ardent commitment to the value of selflessness, let us say, alleviates feelings of helplessness or powerlessness (*GM* I 11); for others that same estimation preserves a much longed-for connection to a community of scholars or can serve as a means of 'self-narcosis' (*GM* III 23); for others still the moral formula assuages uncertainty (*GS* 347). The problem, it seems, as Nietzsche puts it in *On the Genealogy of*

Morality, is that the question of morality's 'value' *to what end* 'cannot be examined too closely' (*GM I 17*). Hence, far from marking out a purely idiosyncratic set of preferences, this analysis tells us something squarely *suprapersonal*: moral values function to address psychological needs. In this way, the personal, it seems to me, is indeed metaphilosophical or, at least, meta-axiological. So, much more interesting, to my mind at least, is that, far from some 'implosion of metaphilosophy', as Brusotti has it, we see dimensions of Nietzsche's substantive view revealed: self-effacing philosophical methods obscure the functions that morality serves by imposing that impersonality on morality itself.

Supposing we can agree that at least part of Nietzsche's concern is with philosophical approaches that uncritically carry over such 'metaphysical biases and assumptions', how, then, might philosophy properly proceed? (p. 66) In opening the second part of the volume, 'The Nature of Philosophy', and in drawing primarily on Nietzsche's free spirit works, Rebecca Bamford answers: by experimentation. 'Experimentation means', Bamford maintains, 'deploying diverse ways of being towards the world in order to know it' (p. 71). So understood, this mode of philosophical inquiry engages our affective responses (p. 71), calls upon us to act with courage in risking error or embarrassment (p. 69) and is at once 'knowledge-seeking' (p. 72) and 'essentially open-ended' (p. 78). Of particular interest to Bamford are these experimental 'procedures, not the product, of inquiry' (p. 75). In attending to the procedures—to experimentation, in the broadest sense of the term—Bamford is able to offer a conciliatory approach: it is theoretically possible for Nietzsche to reject scientific practices that purport to be value-independent and objective while nevertheless employing the experimental methods, so described. This solves the tension we first encountered with Meyer's essay—the question, specifically, of how we are to understand Nietzsche's critique and praise of the natural sciences—in, what is to my mind at least, a more textually satisfying and plausible manner.

The contributions from Paul S. Loeb and Robert B. Pippin tell us less about how to do philosophy, on Nietzsche's view, than, respectively, whether Nietzsche achieves the legislative task he lays out and how philosophy ought to be written and read. Drawing from *Beyond Good and Evil* and with great exegetical care, Loeb asks the question: if, as we have seen, genuine philosophers are 'those who issue commands and laws: they say "it shall be so!"' (*BGE 211*), does Nietzsche himself achieve such a legislative status or does he remain forever a 'philosophical labourer', 'studying past ideals' (p. 104)? Loeb's answer is mixed: 'we should stop looking', he advises us, 'for places in Nietzsche's texts where he himself, writing in his own voice, creates values', and instead look to his character Zarathustra (p. 99). In so doing, we find the character issuing one such law: the normative command that humans ought to engage in their self-overcoming (p. 101). This part of the

paper is the least persuasive, not necessarily because of any issue with Loeb's interpretation of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, but because the specific points at which Nietzsche ends and Zarathustra begins are vague.

Pippin operates from a different starting point: Pippin argues that attending to how Nietzsche asks to be read—'very slowly and very closely' (p. 106)—and to how he often writes—'masked' (p. 111)—can tell us something fundamental about what philosophy is. Pippin frames the connection in this way: philosophers are often misinterpreted, but more often it is the case that 'another chapter in a tradition. . . expose[s] [their philosophy] as, at its worst, a "joke" or foolish' (p. 111). Accordingly, 'another way of writing [masked] is necessary to prevent this' (p. 111). Consequently, Pippin focuses on a key part of *Beyond Good and Evil*, The Religious Essence [*Das religiöse Wesen*]. In slowing down, in looking beneath the surface, Pippin clarifies that new questions emerge, such that Nietzsche's new mode of thinking about religiosity, in this case, can be ushered in (p. 122).

As far as I can tell, the key puzzle goes unanswered: does this analysis tell us something about the practice of philosophy as such, or merely Nietzsche's rhetorical choices? Indeed, it seems clear that Nietzsche anticipates being misunderstood (*GM* III 1; *EH* P 1); it is less clear, however, that this is a source of anxiety or even shame. More specifically, and on the interpretive issue of religiosity and shame, another key question remains unresolved: namely is there a connection between the shamelessness of the Dionysus (*BGE* 295) and the question and answer that close *Ecce Homo*: 'Have I been understood? — *Dionysus versus the crucified . . .*' (*EH* 'Destiny' 9). If we think that philosophy aims at liberation, understood in one place by Nietzsche as the overcoming of shame, perhaps there is a rather fruitful link to be made (*GS* 275). These worries might be excused, however, if we place a premium on the mode of writing that Pippin's Nietzsche encourages: one that calls upon its readers to be curious. Nevertheless, the piece, to my mind, raises more questions than it answers.

Further expanding on the subject of style and metaphilosophy, Mark Alfano's contribution begins Part III 'The Method of Philosophy' by arguing that Nietzsche makes use of the rhetorical tropes of apostrophic address and summoning to affectively engage the audience with the aim of reorienting their perspectives (p. 140). Hence, on this reading, 'perspectivism is a psychological method for inducing affects, emotions, and evaluations' (p. 139). Those familiar with Alfano's work will not be surprised that this piece makes use of a digital humanities approach and is admirably clear. One may wonder, however, whether if 'the aim of perspectivism as a methodology is epistemic', if it helps us to see alternatives, this mode of philosophy can reach those who do not already see affective or knowledge claims as perspectival. Suppose shame has a globalizing tendency: to admit its verdict—I am a failure—as the only one. If that seems plausible, I am left wondering whether summoning or a mode of apostrophic address can indeed free one from an

affective perspective that does not admit itself as such. This concern seems to extend beyond such seemingly intractable affects. Arguably, at least, one worry Nietzsche has with morality is that it similarly takes this universalizing form, one that refuses to see itself as perspectival in kind and its attending knowledge claims as themselves situated.

The papers immediately following Alfano's—Tsarina Doyle's 'Nietzsche's Philosophical Naturalism' and Paul Katsafanas' 'Nietzsche's Moral Methodology'—are concerned with Nietzsche's account of values. Doyle focuses on the will to power as a means by which Nietzsche can avoid the reductionist tendencies of the sciences, all the while giving an account of how our values fit into nature. Katsafanas' concern is broader in scope as he addresses whether Nietzsche is indeed, as Simmel has it, 'the Copernicus of philosophical ethics' (p. 165).

Katsafanas offers an intriguing exploration of the standard assumption concerning the proper methods of philosophical ethics. He shows that the idea of a theory-independent method of philosophy, one that is able to offer rational authority or justification from which ethical claims can be derived. Such theory-independence, however, Nietzsche shows, harbours presuppositions or background assumptions whereby philosophers reify the predominant values of their *milieu*. Instead of seeking rational grounds or justification, Nietzsche, on this view, engages in a comparative assessment of ethical claims based upon four constraints. Katsafanas glosses these constraints in the following way: 'the theory must not be dependent on false presuppositions about human agency; it must not instantiate norms that conflict with flourishing; it must provide us with some higher values; it must not foster moral pathologies such as decadence, hypertrophy, and mendacity' (p. 183). This schema is a useful one: it charts Nietzsche's multifaceted, and at times disparate, critique of 'morality'; it allows us to evaluate moral claims and theories in terms of these constraints, which can be a pertinent countermeasure to the idea that Nietzsche's critique of morality amounts to the undefended assertion of evaluative preferences; and finally, as Katsafanas shows, it can be used to evaluate Simmel's claim that Nietzsche is 'the Copernicus of philosophical ethics' (p. 165). As to the Simmel issue, Katsafanas concludes, the result is mixed: insofar as Nietzsche contends that ethics concerns itself with human flourishing, for example, Nietzsche is shown to fall in line with tradition; insofar as Nietzsche assesses those concerns in terms of pathologies or will to power, he marks out new space.

We might wonder, however, about the connection between these constraints and Nietzsche's philosophical methods. For instance, it seems clear to me that these constraints support a negative thesis—namely that conventional philosophical methods based on theory-independent justification are unreliable—and thereby tell us something important about how philosophy ought not to be done. Yet, do such constraints support Nietzsche's positive view? Otherwise put, if Katsafanas is correct, and I think he is, that Nietzsche objects to ethical theories on the grounds that they foster pathologies, what

philosophical methods does Nietzsche employ to bear this out? One thought is that instead of adopting the unreliable approaches of previous philosophers, Nietzsche makes use of typologies or genealogies by which we can reflect on the origins, histories, and competing interests that helped to shape such (pathological) responses (*BGE* 186; *GM passim*). So understood, in such a case, Nietzsche's positive account of how philosophy ought to be done is not to be found by looking to the constraints, but rather, to retain the example, in Nietzsche's typological or genealogical approaches to inquiry.

Further on the issue of pathology, the contributions of João Consta?ncio and Jacqueline Scott to the collection's final part, entitled 'The Aims of Philosophy', argue that a philosophy that loses a sense for the tragic will further exacerbate our maladies, particularly that of decadence. In this way, both Consta?ncio and Scott offer a welcome point of contrast to the characterization of philosophy as a squarely legislative task.

Constâncio, by way of an illuminating and close reading of section 373 of *The Gay Science*, makes plainer Nietzsche's aesthetic conception of philosophy. Crucial to Constâncio's view is that Nietzsche's conception of 'good taste' can be understood as a mode of quasi-Kantian reflective judgment that invites a multiplicity of affective perspectives to bear on an issue (p. 202). Good taste, so understood, further requires an appreciation of 'rich ambiguity' (*GS* 373, emphasis in original) of existence, has a 'sense for the tragic', and encourages the formation of evaluative judgments (p. 199). Importantly, philosophy understood in this aesthetic sense can be readily distinguished from mechanistic approaches that eschew affective value judgments in favour of the impersonal, formulaic, and reductive (pp. 204-206).

Scott too places a premium on the aesthetic conception of philosophy, but her focus is on what Nietzsche takes himself to be, namely 'the first tragic philosopher' (*EH* 'Birth' 3). The tragic insight, the ugly truth, that guides such a thinker is, we are told, this: we long for meaning even as 'the only "truth" we have about our lives ... [is] that they are at root meaningless' (p. 248). Accordingly, Scott argues, the task of philosophy guided by such truth must 'create values to hold off suicidal despair, but [recognize that] any value that we create will decay' (p. 250). Tragic philosophy, so understood, creates the conditions in which we may carry on, warts and all, without evasion. My framing may be misleading, though. Nietzsche, and Scott for that matter, require of us more than mere endurance. What they are after is something of a rare achievement: to hold the tragic insight and, like the Heraclitean child—'a child that places stones here and there and builds sand hills only to overthrow them again'—build nonetheless (*BT* 24). Scott makes use of this form of philosophizing to argue that 'we need to adopt a tragic view of our racialized lives: an acceptance of the endemic and chronic nature of racism in our society without falling victim to the bad conscience-induced resignation and resentment that plague so many people today ... This is not solely an American cultural problem. It is also one that plagues our own discipline' (p. 248). This is a tremendous

paper, one that asks if we too have the courage and strength, as Scott clearly does, to address these terrible truths.

What of Nietzsche's relationship to traditional metaphysics? Beatrix Himmelmann's 'Metaphilosophy and Metapolitics in Nietzsche and Heidegger' and Scott Jenkins' 'Nietzsche's Psychology of Metaphysics (or Metaphysics as Revenge)' take up this question. Himmelmann argues that while for both Nietzsche and Heidegger metaphilosophy is of 'intrinsic importance' (p. 207), the thinkers differ, Himmelmann shows, on the metaphysical status of will to power.

Jenkins focuses on an unpublished note (*WP* 579/*KSA* 12:8 [2]) that sketches 'the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians' (p. 227), which helps lay bare the unconscious motivations for philosophizing. Of particular interest to Jenkins is Nietzsche's idea that "behind "reason" in philosophy we find the

interesting (p. 227).

One might wish that the volume had more to say about the practice of genealogy (95-99). Some, myself included, hold that the genealogical mode of inquiry is among 'Nietzsche's greatest contribution[s] to philosophical thought' (Huddleston 2019, p. 172; Scott 2020). This form of doing philosophy concerns itself with how our values developed, and, in particular, how these values once worked to address certain needs, but now only perpetuate our self-misunderstandings. Indeed, if, as we have seen, Nietzsche is interested in the legislation of value, then of concern too are questions of how values function, for whom, and what, if anything, might justify such claims. The practice of genealogy is useful, I think, as a methodological approach to addressing such issues.

Further still, and beyond the domain of Nietzsche Studies, this form of inquiry has been used to exercise considerable force in addressing urgent social issues, such as racism, sexism, and ableism (Tremain 2017; McWhorter 2009) or in clarifying and examining our most cherished concepts (Williams 2002). Simple proliferation is not, in itself, decisive or conclusive. It tells us nothing, for example, about whether this mode of inquiry has any value or any distinctive merit. Indeed, whether it is a unique mode of philosophical investigation is hardly settled in Nietzsche Studies, of course, as some find not a novel method but rather simply history correctly done (Schuringa 2014). Still, a piece devoted to some of these issues would not have been out of place.

Leaving the practice of genealogy to the side, we can raise similar questions about the absence of other forms of philosophy that Nietzsche seems to herald. For instance, does Nietzsche ever abandon his early call to historical philosophy (*HH* I 2)?

These concerns notwithstanding, as I hope to have shown, the contributions of this volume help us to see a Nietzsche who is deeply concerned with the tasks and aims of philosophy, and one who offers a subtle, perhaps even

novel metaphilosophical stance. As a result, this volume is a rich resource and is certainly a welcome addition to Nietzsche Studies.

References

- Huddleston, Andrew. 2019. *Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McWhorter, Ladelle. 2009. *Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1988. *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe*. Ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1989. *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York; Vintage.
- 1996. *Human, All-Too Human*. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 1997. *Daybreak*. Edited by Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 1999. *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*. Edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs. Translated by Ronald Speirs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 2001. *The Gay Science*. Edited by Bernard Williams. Translated by Josefine Naukhoff and Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- 2002. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman. Translated by Judith Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 2005. *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*. Edited by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman. Translated by Judith Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schuringa, Christoph. 2014. "Nietzsche's Genealogical Histories and His Project of Revaluation" *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 31 (3) 249–269.
- Scott, Jacqueline. 2020. "Decadent Philosophy's Misunderstanding of the Body and the Artistic Flourishing of Culture: Comments on *Nietzsche on the Decadence and Flourishing of Culture*" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 51 (2) 221–230.
- Tremain, Shelley. 2017. *Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Williams, Bernard. 2002. *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

California State University, San Marcos, United States ALLISON MERRICK
 amerrick@csusm.edu
 doi: 10.1093/mind/fzabo67